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In their conception and practice of economics, Alfred Marshall and John M. Keynes have been 
increasingly regarded as old-fashioned economists. According to a widely shared opinion in 
mainstream economics, they adopted loose definitions and generic concepts; they did not make 
extensive use of mathematics as “an engine of inquiry”; they were unsystematic in their discussion; 
they did  not support their opinions by means of systematic statistical analysis.  All of this  stands in 
sharp contrast with the conception of economics largely prevailing after the Second World War, which 
is based on deductive models, consistent with standard economic principles and highly dosed with 
mathematics, which have to be econometrically tested and applied to reality in order to achieve general 
results able to hold for all times and institutional contexts.  
A consequence of the dominance of this conception  has been that Marshall and Keynes – although they 
have been recognised as having offered important contributions to the development of modern 
economics  - have been considered economists belonging to an older era of economics when the 
methodological (and analytical) status of our discipline had not yet been clearly defined and generally 
shared.  
However, there were a small number of economists who were more hesitant to share this prevailing 
opinion and even tended to go against it in the post-war years and even in the 1970s and 1980s, times 
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2 In their opinion what the first group of economists 
reproached Marshall and Keynes for  – looseness of definition, non systematic use of mathematics and 
statistics, limited scope for pure theory  – did not  prove that their thought was obsolete, but rather gave 
evidence that they had a lively sense that   economic phenomena are interrelated in a complex way and 
that history and institutions play a role in their evolution. They claimed that Marshall and Keynes had a 
clear understanding of the specificity of the economic reasoning and were aware of the problem of 
using formal methods to cope with complexity. This is actually an issue not yet solved in a totally 
satisfying way in our contemporary era. As Coase (1975) wrote discussing Marshall on method, they 
maintained that the events since the 1940s would hardly have led them to change their view that the 
extensive use of formalism would lead economists away from constructive work.
3    
The music changed a bit in the 1990s when an increasing number of economists successfully 
challenged the mainstream approach in many sub-fields. They thought it worked well only for 
structurally simple models but was inadequate or wrong for complex economic s ystems. There were 
more references to our 'old-fashioned authors', especially Marshall, who were considered the precursors 
of the new wave of a somewhat heterodox economics. Their epistemological and methodological 
thought became a topic of interest
4. However, some of these  references were too often quite 
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many cases, these authors were treated as only as old-fashioned fellow-travellers.   
It is my opinion that in a discussion of this issue – the supposed old-fashioned attitude of Marshall and 
Keynes towards economics  – the question of the nature and method of economic thinking of the two 
authors needs to be deeply examined. This also involves a history-of-thought-type question: “Did they 
have a common philosophical and methodological concept of economics ?”. There is no established 
answer to this. One certainly tends to say yes. However, with a very few exceptions, the issue has been 
scarcely discussed c omprehensively  by the historians of economic thought. An inquiry into this topic 
would allow us to shed more light on the characteristics and interrelationship of the old and new 
schools of Cambridge. It could  also help us handle our first question on the theoretical progress of 
economics with reference to the Marshall’s and Keynes’ era (The technical progress is not an issue).  
Have the obviously indisputable  accomplishments of economics in the second part of the Twentieth 
Century  been accompanied by a  consciousness of the methodological issues involved in the economic 
discourse of both mainstream and heterodox economists ? In other words, are Marshall’s and Keynes’ 
views on the nature of economic thinking outmoded and is the methodological question in  economics, 
as they put it,  definitely over ? 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss these questions. The fact that sometimes, but quite regularly, 
doubts on these questions emerge in the minds of economists, seems to be a good reason for supposing 
that t hey should not be forgotten. Perhaps this could turn out to be one of these cases in which “we 
stand to profit from visit to the lumber room” (Schumpeter 1954: 4). 
  2.  Marshall on the nature and method of economics in the Principles of Economics 
  
     2.1. Towards the Principles: “The present position of economics” 
 
Marshall's interest in economics began in a period in which this discipline was confronted with an 
identity crisis due to the theoretical and political difficulties of classical economists'  apparatus. In 
addition, there were the attacks of those who, like Comte, argued against any separate study of any 
single part of social phenomena and people who, like those of the historical school argued against any 
formal theory and preferred a a kind of 'from fact to fact' reasoning. One of the issues of this crisis was 
the scientific status of economics. Is economics a science ? If so what type of science is economics ? 
What is its method ? These were the crucial questions at stake. To answer these questions was 
Marshall’s task.  
As Schumpeter wrote, "the discovery that there is a thing as a general method of economic analysis" 
was not Marshall's, "but no economist before Marshall ever grasped the meaning of this so fully" 
(1941: 101-2). The point is clearly made by Marshall in "The present position of economics", his 1885 
Cambridge introductory lecture. Here he begins refuting Comte's and historical school's criticisms. 
Marshall maintains that "the complexity and intricacy of social phenomena afford no r eason for 
dispensing with the aid of the economic organon in its proper place: on the contrary they increase the 
necessity of it". He refutes the historical school maintaining that "facts by themselves are silent" 
(Marshall 1925 [1885]:166). His second step was to clarify his position on classical political economy. 
Marshall stresses his continuity with Ricardo and the classical economists as founders of economics on 
a scientific basis, but he also points out what he thinks to be their error: "Ricardo and h is followers 
neglected a large group of facts". He  writes:  
 
They regarded man as, so to speak, a constant quantity, and gave themselves little trouble to study his variations …   [They 
did not allow for] human passions, instincts and habits, sympathies and antipathies ... They therefore attributed to the forces 
of supply and demand a much more mechanical and regular action than they actually have  …  They did not see how liable 
to change are the habits and institutions of industry (ibid.: 155).    
 
Marshall maintains his generation had shifted their perspective on economics “due to the discovery that 
man himself is in a great measure a creature of circumstances and change with them" (ibid.: 153). He 
emphasises that economics is indebted to the scientific m ovement for this change, particularly to 
biology, which had permitted the emergence of clearer ideas as to the nature of organic growth. Finally Marshall identifies the function of economic theory in supplying a machinery  “to aid us in reasoning 
about those motives of human action which are measurable”. In this sense  “[Economics] is not a body 
of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth" (ibid.: 159).  This scientific 
machinery allows the economists to work “in the light of facts”(ibid.: 171). 
In the years immediately before the publication of the  Principles Marshall had an important discussion 
with J.N. Keynes about his book Scope and Method of Political Economy, the proofs of which Marshall 
read and commented on. In a letter to J.N. Keynes probably from September, 1889, Marshall indicates 
where they differ, objecting to Keynes' “more orderly nature” and saying that he had taken “an extreme 
position as to the methods & scope of economics”. Marshall goes on: 
 
In my new book – I say of methods simply that economics has to use every method known to science. And as to the scope, I 
say  ‘Economics is a study of mans actions in the ordinary business of life .. it inquires how he gets his income & how he 
uses it’ (letter of September 1889).  
 
And as regards the definition, he says:  
 
Generally I never discuss any line of division or demarcation except to say that nature has shown no hard & fast lines, & 
that any lines man draws are merely for the convenience of occasion: & shd never be treated as though they were rigid 
(ibid.). 
 
The final systematisation of his methodological thought took place in the  Principles. As it is well 
known, the  Principles had eight editions However, in reference to the question of method, a 
comparison of the different editions shows that the final version was drafted between the third and fifth 
edition  – i. e., between the middle of the 1890s and 1907. Furthermore, an examination of the variants 
in the text through all the editions reveals that they are mainly stylistic, but that his ideas and the key 
reasoning had remained clearly defined since the first edition of 1890.   
  
 
2.2. The Principles: Economics as a science of social complexity 
 
In chapter 2 of the  Principles, Marshall defines economics as “a study of men as they live and move 
and think in  the ordinary business of life” (Marshall 1961: 14). Shortly after he counters the excessive 
abstraction of theoreticians like Ricardo and Walras, emphasising that economics studies “the actions of individuals … in relation to social life … They deal with man as he is: not with an abstract or 
‘economic man’; but  a man of flesh and blood” (ibid.: 26-7, my italics).  Marshall specifies that 
economics focuses on that side of life in which "man's conduct is more deliberate and in which he most 
often reckons up the advantages and disadvantages of any particular action before he enters on it" 
(ibid.: 20-1). This subject is amenable to quantification and therefore, to some degree, "to treatment by 
scientific machinery" (ibid.: 15). Economics is a science
5, Marshall maintains. However, he adds that 
economics differs from the ‘harder’ sciences
6, particularly mathematical physics. It must follow the 
example of  exact sciences despite the fact that their simplicity and precision  are  not attainable  
because of the variety and uncertainty of human actions.  Marshall writes:   
 
Let us then consider more closely the nature of economic laws, and their limitations. Every cause has a tendency to produce 
some definite result if nothing occurs to hinder it .. The law of gravitation states how any two things attract one another; 
how they tend to move towards one another, and will move towards one another if nothing interferes to prevent them. The 
law of gravitation is therefore a statement of tendencies.  It is a very exact statement .. Now there are no economic 
tendencies which act as steadily and can be measured as exactly as gravitation can: and consequently there are no laws of 
economics which can be compared for precision with the law of gravitation (ibid.: 31, my italics) 
 
At that time some critics said that the term ‘economic law’ was inappropriate because there were no 
definite and universal propositions in economics equivalent to the physics’ laws of gravitation and of 
conservation of energy. Marshall refuted the objection as irrelevant. In a passage of the 3rd and 4
th 
editions of the Principles, Marshall writes:  
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Economics is for Marshall a discipline which aspires to be a science of social complexity
7. Actually 
Marshall compares the laws of economics to those of biology and to the laws of tides: 
 
The laws of biology, for instance, or – to take an example from a purely physical science – the laws of tides, like those of 
economics vary much in definiteness, in range of application and in certainty (ibid.) Economics, like biology, deals with a 
matter, of which the inner nature and constitution, as well as the outer form, are constantly changing (Marshall 1961: 772). 
The laws of economics  have to be compared with the laws of the tides …People can calculate beforehand when the tide 
will probably be at its highest on any day at London Bridge … No one knows enough about the weather to be able to say 
beforehand how it will act (ibid.: 32).  
 
In Book 1, Chapter 4, Marshall again emphasises: “In sciences that relate to man exactness is less 
attainable”. In  history for example: 
 
The scientific student of history is hampered by his inability to experiment and even more by the absence of any objective 
standard to which his estimates of relative proportion can be referred. Such estimates are latent in almost every stage of his 
argument: he cannot conclude that one cause or group of causes has been overridden by another without making some 
implicit estimate of their relative weights. And yet it is only by a great effort that he perceives how dependent he is on his 
own subjective impressions (ibid.: 44).  
 
Marshall recognises that the economist is also hampered by this difficulty,  but he is hampered less than 
other students of man’s actions:  
 
indeed he has some share in those advantages which give precision and objectivity to the work of the physicist. So long, at 
all events, as he is concerned with current and recent events, many of this fact group themselves under classes as to which 
statements can be made that are definite, and often were approximately accurate numerically; and thus he is at some 
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 advantage in seeking for causes and for results which lie below the surface, and are not easily seen; and in analysing 
complex conditions into their elements and in reconstructing a whole out of many elements (ibid., my italics).   
 
It is apparent from this reconstruction that Marshall is very conscious of the difficulty of treating 
economics as a science, which he defines so extensively. The problem lies in the subject-matter itself of 
economics, the “living and ever-changing economic organism” (ibid.: 769). This raises the economist’s 
problem of how to deal with complexity - the problem of method. 
 
 
2.3. The economist’s method of dealing with complexity 
 
2.3.1. Facts, reason and common sense 
 
How does the economist have to deal with complexity ? In the first paragraph of chapter 4 of book I, 
Marshall writes that the economist must start from the analysis of facts  - “The economist must be 
greedy of  facts". As "facts by themselves teach nothing", he must use reason: " reason alone can 
interpret and draw lessons" from the "sequences and coincidences" that history tells about, where 
'reason' means deductive or abstract reasoning. This is not enough, however: "The work to be done is 
so various that much of it must be left to be dealt with by trained common sense, which is the ultimate 
arbiter in every practical problem". It follows that: 
 
'Economic science is but the working of common sense aided by appliances of organised analysis and general reasoning, 
which facilitate the task of collecting, arranging, and drawing inferences from particular facts” (ibid.: 38, my italics).   
 
Marshall emphasises that common sense must be ‘trained’ to carry out its task. In  fact he distinguishes 
(Marshall 1885) between “untutored common sense or public opinion” and trained common sense. The 
first is knowledge based on surface phenomena unconcerned with the complexity of reality. The second  
is a sort of  conscious common sense, which is concerned with complexity, gives flexibility to reason, 
contextualizes theoretical models, and avoids the risks of abstract reasoning. 
The crucial position that Marshall gives to trained common sense  – as if it were a sort of superior 
reasoning  -  has an important implication for the language of economics. Marshall writes that 
“[economics’] ..  must endeavour to conform itself to the familiar terms of everyday life, and so far as 
possible must use them as they are commonly used” (Marshall 1961: 5 1). For Marshall everyday language makes it possible to maintain the  shades of meaning that in common use every word has, 
which can be interpreted “by the context” (ibid.: 51, my italics): 
  
The economist  … must make the terms in common use serve his purpose in the expression of precise thought, by the aid of 
qualifying adjectives or other indications in the context. If he arbitrarily assigns a rigid exact use to a word which has 
several more or less vague uses in the market place, he confuses business men, and he is in some danger of committing 
himself to untenable positions  (ibid.: 81-2, my italics)   
  
This ‘complex’ approach to the economic problem requires that the good economist has many qualities.  
Marshall writes:  
 
“The economist needs the three great intellectual faculties, perception, imagination, and reason: and most of all he needs 
imagination, to put him on the track of those causes of visible events which are remote or lie below the surface, and of those 
effects of visible causes which are remote or lie below the surface” (ibid.: 43).  
 
The possession of those faculties enables the economist to study concrete cases in depth  to – i.e., touse 
what Marshall calls the intensive method of research.
8 
In dealing with complexity, the role of deductive reasoning is limited. It does not exhaust the 
economist’s entire reasoning at all. As Marshall writes in his often cited letter to Edgeworth (August 
28, 1902), “abstract, or general, or theoretical economics” seems to him “an essential but a very small 
part of economic proper”. What is the exact role of abstract reasoning in economics for Marshall ? This 
question deserves to be taken further.  
 
                                                                 
8 In Principles  (Part III, chapter 4) there is a note on the difficulties of the statistical study of consumption. Marshall 
distinguishes between two methods of research, intensive and extensive. He cites Fréderic Le Play’s  Les ouvriers 
européennes as a good example of intensive method. Le Play was a mathematician and engineer who, according to 
Schumpeter, “deserves a place in the history of economic analysis because of the method of studying family budgets” 
(Schumpeter 1954: 523): 
"The method of Le Play's monumental Les Ouvrieres Européennes is the intensive study of all the details of the domestic 
life of a few carefully chosen families. To work it well requires a rare combination of judgement in selecting cases, and of 
insight and sympathy in interpreting them. At its best, it is the best of all: but in ordinary hands it is likely to suggest more 
untrustworthy general conclusions, than those obtained by the extensive method of collecting more rapidly very numerous 
observations, reducing them as far as possible to statistical form, and obtaining broad averages in which inaccuracies and 
idiosyncrasies may be trusted to counteract one another to some extent" (Marshall 1961: 116)
 .  
2.3.2. The role of abstract (deductive) reasoning  
 
To cope with complex problems, the economist first divides them into parts in order to reduce them to 
simple problems, using the hypothesis of  ceteris paribus and excluding the influence of time (that is, 
adopting the statical method which assumes static or stationary conditions). He then  proceeds step by 
step to successive approximations.   This procedure is effective for the earlier stages of economic 
reasoning. In 1898 Marshall answered his critics, focusing mainly on clarifying the nature and 
limitations of the statical method in economics. He writes: 
 
There is a fairly close analogy between the earlier stages of economic reasoning and the devices of physical statics. But is 
there an equally serviceable analogy between the later stages of economic reasoning and the methods of physical dynamics 
? I think not. I think that in the later stages of economics better analogies are to be got from biology than from physics; and 
consequently, that economic reasoning should start on methods analogous to those of physical statics, and should gradually 
become more biological in tone … The method will become ever more remote from the physical and more akin to the 




The catastrophes of mechanics are caused by changes in the quantity and not in character of the forces at work: whereas in 
life their character changes also. ‘Progress’ or ‘evolution’, industrial and social, is not mere increase and decrease. It is 
organic growth, chastened and confined and occasionally reversed by decay of innumerable factors, each of which 
influences and is influenced by those around it; and every such mutual influence varies with the stages which the respective 
factors have already reached in their growth (ibid.: 42-3). 
 
Furthermore the mathematical engines used in physics, which “work out  large volumes full of 
mathematical formulae and figures” cannot be applied to economics:  
 
The most helpful applications of mathematics to economics are those which are short and simple, which employ few 
symbols; and which aim at throwing a bright light on some small part of the great economic movement rather than at 
representing its endless complexities  (ibid.: 39). 
 
What is the function of deductive reasoning in economics ? Marshall writes: “it is not to forge a  few 
long chains of reasoning, but to forge rightly  many short chains  and single connecting links” (Principles, appendix C, p. 773). This aspect is taken up again in Appendix D, “Uses of abstracting 
reasoning in economics”, where Marshall explains that it is illusory to think that there is room for long 
trains of deductive reasoning in economics since economic material is often inadequate to bear the 
strains of the mathematician’s machinery: 
 
It is obvious that there is no room in economics for long trains of deductive reasoning … It may indeed appear at first sight 
that the contrary is suggested by the frequent use of mathematical formulae in economic studies. But on investigation it will 
be found that this suggestion is illusory … [The mathematician] takes no technical responsibility for the material, and is 
often unaware how inadequate the material is to bear the strains of his powerful machinery (ibid.: 781).  
 
Hence Marshall maintains that it is the nature of economic material that limits the use of mathematics.. 
The reason that long trains of deductive reasoning cannot be made is that, as we move from a 
determined situation, the variables at stake increase in number and intensity in relation to external 
circumstances.  It is not a problem to manipulate more givens, Marshall emphasises, but rather to 
widen the connections. In other words, it is impossible to characterise a few causes as predominant to 
render the hypothesis of  ceteris paribus practicable. The attempt to translate a complex problem into a 
system of equations is bound to fail for considerations “connected with the manifold influences of the 
element of time”: 
 
While a mathematical illustration of the mode of action of a definite set of causes may be  complete in itself, and strictly 
accurate within its clearly definite limits, it is otherwise with any attempt to grasp the whole of a complex problem of real 
life, or even any considerable part of it, in a series of equations. For many important considerations, especially those 
connected with the manifold influences of the element of time, do not lend themselves easily to mathematical expression:   
they must either be omitted altogether, or clipped and pruned till they resemble the conventional birds and animal of 
decorative art  (ibid.: 850, my italics).  
 
Omission of certain factors and/or  their ‘embellishment’ in order to render them mathematically 
manageable are the consequences of the problem with lending these factors to mathematical 
expression. This problem deserves to be  emphasised, because, according to Marshall,  it “arises a 
tendency towards assigning wrong proportions to economic forces”:  
 
those elements being most emphasised which lend themselves most easily to analytical methods. No doubt this danger is 
inherent in every application not only of mathematical analysis, but of analysis of any kind, to the problem of real life. It is a 
danger which more than any other the economist must have in mind at every turn (ibid.: 850-1, my italics).   
The risk of concentrating on the variables more easily reducible to analytical treatment at  the expense 
of the realism of the model is frequently mentioned by Marshall. It often reappears in his 
correspondence with colleagues.  For example, in a letter to Bowley  (February 21, 1901) he is 
particularly effective in his argument against formalism:  
 
I think the economic, as distinguished from the mathematical, student is hurt by being invited to spend his time on them 
[mathematical toys], before he has made a sufficiently realistic study of those  statistics to know roughly, without 
calculation, on which side of the target the center of the shots lies. He assumes there is no wind. I believe that a Boer 
marksman, who takes account of the wind, will by instinct get neater the truth than he by mathematics. 
 
 
2.2.3. Abstract reasoning at work: Book V of the Principles 
 
The role and limits of abstract reasoning are illustrated in Book V of  Principles, entitled "General 
relations of demand, supply and value",  the only ‘theoretical’ book of the entire volume. “The word 
‘Theory’ applies to the title of that book alone. It deals with abstractions”, Marshall writes in his 1898 
article:  
 
Its aim is not so much the acquisition of knowledge, as of power; power to order and arrange knowledge … When so 
isolated [the chief economic forces at work] will almost always show an equilibrium point .. And the conception of this 
equilibrium point helps to give precision to the ideas  (Marshall 1898: 52) 
 
This equilibrium is conceived as a mechanical equilibrium: “a simpler balancing of forces which 
corresponds rather to the mechanical equilibrium of a stone hanging by an elastic string, or of a number 
of balls resting against one another in a basin” (ibid.: 323). Its purpose is to lay the way for the study of 
the equilibrium "as resembling a balancing of forces of life and decay" (ibid.).  
Marshall studies the theory of value with regards to the normal cost of production of a commodity 
relative to a given aggregate volume of production in a competitive context. The first step of the 
analysis  is the definition of equilibrium o f normal demand and supply of a commodity  that obeys the 
law of diminishing returns. The second step is the definition of equilibrium with reference to short and 
long periods. Here Marshall introduces the fiction of the stationary state, less abstract than the usual 
static conditions.  After that, Marshall aims to limit the abstractness of reasoning in the analysis of long term equilibrium. He refused to assume that "every business remained always of the same size and with 
the same trade connections" (ibid.: 367). Instead, Marshall introduces the representative firm. This is a 
‘normal firm’  – in the sense that it “must be one which has a fairly long life, and fair success, which is 
managed with normal ability, and which has normal access to the economies, e xternal and internal, 
which belong to that aggregate volume of production” (ibid.: 317).  This firm grows with an increase in 
the aggregate volume of production. Some firms rise and others decline. The representative firm 
represents the average firm. In this way Marshall brings together the equilibrium of the industry and the 
disequilibrium of the individual firms which are members of the industry. 
The difficulty and risks of assuming the  ceteris paribus condition “reach their highest point in 
connection with industries which conform to the law of Increasing Returns” (Marshall 1898: 49). It is 
just in connection with those industries that “the most alluring applications of the method are to be 
found” (ibid.). Long-term supply curves in relation to such industries are irrealistic, Marshall says: 
“[They] are fascinatingly  clear and vivid, but they are made too clear and vivid to be at all near to 
reality” (ibid.). The analysis of equilibrium with reference to increasing returns is the most important 
case  in w hich the use of the hypothesis of ceteris paribus is not practicable. In a note in chapter 12 of 
book V  Marshall writes:  
 
Abstract reasoning as to the effects of the economies in production, which an individual firm gets from an increase of its 
output are apt to be misleading, not only in detail, but even in their general effect.  This is nearly the same as saying that in 
such case the conditions governing supply should be represented in their totality.  They are often vitiated by difficulties 
which lie rather below the surface, and are especially troublesome in attempts to express the equilibrium conditions of trade 
by mathematical formulae (ibid.: 459n)  
 
And he continues criticising “the great Cournot” who in this case, according to Marshall, misapplied 
mathematics: 
 
Some, among whom Cournot himself is to be counted, have before them what is in effect the supply schedule of an 
individual firm; representing that an increase in its output gives it command over so great internal economies as much to 
diminish its expenses of production; and they follow their mathematics boldly, but apparently without noticing that their 
premises lead inevitably to the conclusion that, whatever firm first gets a good start will obtain a monopoly of the whole 
business of its trade in its district. While others avoiding this horn of the dilemma, maintain that there is no equilibrium at 
all for commodities which obey the law of increasing return; and some again have called in question the validity of any 
supply schedule which represents prices diminishing as the amount produced increases … (ibid., see also Marshall 1898) 
 In the same note Marshall refers to Note XIV of the Mathematical Appendix. There he maintains that 
in the case of commodities whose expenses of production diminish rapidly with every increase in the 
amount produced, "the causes that govern the limits of production are so complex that it seems hardly 
worth while to attempt to translate them into mathematical language” (ibid.: 849).   
According to Marshall, economic  reasoning must abandon the mechanical method at this point of 
complexity and become “more biological in tone” in order to solve this difficulty. This is the 
fundamental role of the device of the  representative firm. Here, in fact, it is necessary ‘especially when 
we are considering industries which show a tendency to increasing return’ (Marshall 1961: 376n, our 
italics). He writes that “by concentrating our attention on such a firm we escape many of the difficulties 
which attach to problems of very long period equilibrium” (Marshall 1898: 50).  Marshall observes that 
the tendency to a fall in  the price of a commodity as a result of a gradual development of the industry 
that makes it is ‘quite a different thing from the tendency to rapid introduction of new economies by an 
individual firm that is increasing its business’ (Marshall 1961: 376). The reason is that a firm grows 
and decays. If this is not taken into account, there is the risk of falling into ‘Cournot’s error’. The 
device of the representative firm  - representative of the average life cycle of the firm in the industry  -   
permits avoiding this methodological error. Trained common sense is here at work: it brings the 
experience of life and history which permits understanding that theoretical notions must be taken 
broadly. So, it ‘explains’ what theory, with its “few, long-drawn-out and subtle reasonings”,  by itself 
cannot do. 
Is the solution of the difficulty of complexity in economics offered by Marshall satisfactory ? The 
answer of most economists of new generations at that time, at least with regards to the problem of the 
co-existence of increasing returns and competition, was  negative.   
 
 
2.4. Marshall’s dilemma  
 
In our reconstruction of Marshall's thought, economics is conceived in a broad s ense as a science of 
complexity. To cope with complexity, economics cannot be only "abstract reasoning", which is unable 
"to disentangle the interwoven effects of complex causes". For this work, "abstract reasoning" is 
essential. In fact, Marshall writes t o Edgeworth in the letter cited above, "but a wide and thorough 
study of facts is equally essential". To do this, abstract reasoning has to be combined with trained 
common sense and the economist has to have intellectual faculties such as perception and imagination beyond reason also in order to study specific cases intensively. The problem of value and competition 
is an example of great importance for Marshall of this "necessary" combination. When the complexity 
of the problem at issue makes the  ceteris paribus assumption not practicable, a "biological instrument" 
like common sense  must be used to avoid "Cournot's error". In the specific case of the problem of the 
coexistence of increasing returns and competition, Marshall's solution  - the device of the representative 
firm  - does not seem to be satisfactory. Firstly, it holds the discussion of increasing returns inside the 
unnatural cage of the stationary state and does not analyse the path to equilibrium.  These are two of the 
limitations quoted in economic literature, already pointed out in the 1920s by Marshallians like Young 
and Shove (Marchionatti 1992). Secondly, it is not satisfactory because it is based on a characteristic of 
Marshall's conception of scientific investigation that may be interpreted ex post as a  weakness. In the 
passage from methods of reasoning analogous to those of physical statics to methods "more biological 
in tone" the question remains - when does this passage occur ? According to the principle of continuity 
Marshall sees the passage from one to another form of knowledge as a continuum, as a result of the 
application of the method of successive approximation
9. Moreover, in Marshall’s discourse the passage 
seems to be highly dependent on the subjective capabilities of the economist. This is quite problematic 
for such a would-be scientist as the economist is. It was for Marshall, too, who considers the intensive 
method of research the best of all. However,  it "requires a rare combination of judgement in selecting 
cases, and of insight and sympathy in interpreting” the facts, so that  “in ordinary hands it is likely to 
suggest more untrustworthy general conclusions, than those obtained by the  extensive method" 
(Marshall 1961: 116)
 . 
A dilemma comes up again that Marshall hoped to overcome. If economics is reduced to abstract 
reasoning it can make an exact, scientific, discourse, but that runs the risk of becoming sterile. If 
economics wants to cope with complexity, it risks indeterminateness and perhaps excessive 
dependence of subjectiveness. So, Marshall's dilemma seems to run itself into the ground between 
sterile exactness and indeterminate concreteness.  
In the Twenties Marshall's solution of the problem of 'increasing returns and competition' was seen as 
an inextricable mixture of  statics and dynamics, the expression of a vague and inaccurate theory of 
competition (Marchionatti 2000 and 2001). Economists like Knight, Schumpeter, Robbins (and 
partially Young), considered Marshall’s path not practicable and so favoured a clear separation 
between statics and dynamics as different fields of inquiry and considered increasing returns a dynamic 
                                                                 
9 My hypothesis for the reasons for Marshall’s failure to pass from the mechanical to biological perspective presents some 
affinities with Pratten’s (1998) explanation of Marshall’s inability to realize his planned program of research. phenomenon to be investigated in the field of dynamics. In other words they saw a solution of 
continuity where Marshall had seen continuity. Most of Marshall's critics rejected his representative 
firm device as well as his idea of economics as a science of complexity. They preferred economics as a 
‘natural science’, throwing out the baby with the bath-water. Keynes was sympathetic with the critics 
of  Marshall on the point of representative firm (Marchionatti 2001). Keynes was also probably thinking 
of the problem of increasing returns and competition when he wrote that “In his reaction against 
excessive addiction to these methods [diagrams and algebra] .. Marshall has gone too far” (Keynes 
1924: 188). However, Keynes does not give up Marshall's conception of economics. On the contrary, 
he deepened the search of the middle way that Marshall pointed out. 
  
3.  Keynes on  the nature of economics and its method in the years of the General Theory 
  
     3.1. The development of Keynes’ thought  before the 1930s 
 
Before the 1980s no real attention had been paid to the topic of Keynes' method. The prevailing view 
was that Keynes was "pretty uncertain as to the  meaning he wanted to attach to economic theory" 
(Coddington 1976: 57). The new studies  published at the beginning of the 1980s (O'Donnell 1982, 
Skidelsky 1983, Lawson and Pesaran 1985, and Carabelli 1988 -to quote the most exhaustive) focused 
on Keynes' w orks before the  General Theory, his early writings on probability and philosophy, and 
particularly on  A Treatise on Probability,   showing the relevance of them for understanding his 
economics. Nevertheless, these studies largely neglected the role of Marshall in the development of 
Keynes' methodological reflection. Marshall is occasionally remembered as an precursor of Keynes' 
thesis, but their actual relationship is not gone into. More recently the influence of Marshall has been 
recognised (Raffaelli 1996, Coates 1996 and O'Donnell 1997). The purpose of this section is to 
reconstruct the development of Keynes' thought on method briefly, to provide more evidence of 
Marshall's undeniable influence on him, and to show that Keynes' methodological statements can be 




3.1.1. The period 1904-1921: Probability, but not only 
 
In the period of his intellectual formation philosophical interest prevails in Keynes. The  Treatise on 
Probability, where his epistemology finds its foundations, is the result of a long intellectual labour 
which originates in Keynes’ critical reaction to Moore's  Principia Ethica.   It was first formulated as 
his fellowship dissertation completed in 1907. It was turned to a b ook in the following pre-war years, 
but published only in 1921. The book’s main purpose was to give a logical basis to probability that is, 
to define a logic of induction, working in the English analytical tradition, renewed by Bertrand 
Russell's Principia Mathematica.  Probability is defined as the degree of rational belief in a proposition 
on the basis of the evidence available. The validity of the inductive process for Keynes depends on the 
assumption that only a finite number of characteristics are relevant to the proposition under examination. This implies, in Keynes’ words, assuming the hypothesis of atomism  - that the system 
under exam consists of atoms whose effects are distinct, independent and invariable. If the system is 
organic, the inductive method is invalidated. However, “the difficulties .. which are most fundamental 
from the standpoint of the student of probability” regard the numerical measurability of the degree of 
probability (as well as of the goodness and weight of argumentation). To speak of  probability as a 
degree of rational belief, as Keynes actually did, seemed to imply that probabilities are quantitative and 
measurable. On the contrary, “so far from our being able to measure them, it is not even clear that we 
are always able to place them in an order of magnitude” (Keynes 1921: 29). Probabilities, Keynes 
added, even if they exist, may be unknown, due to the vagueness of knowledge. ‘Vague knowledge’ is 
defined as knowledge not susceptible to “strict logical treatment” (ibid.: 17). Furthermore, in a note at 
the end of the second chapter of the  Treatise, Keynes criticises the symbolism of  Principia 
Mathematica and poses the question whether symbolic analysis is more precise and less ambiguous 
than everyday language. He then answers that “there are advantages also in writing the English of 
Hume”. These considerations occupy little room in the  Treatise, but  their importance increased in the 
following years. Coates (1996) notes that Keynes frequently uses the term ‘vague’ in his writings of the 
1930s in order to indicate both complex economic material and  the concepts which  had to represent it.  
In the first period of Keynes' intellectual formation there is also evidence of a fairly important influence 
of Marshall on the development of his thought (Raffaelli 1996 and O'Donnell 1997). Immediately 
before the beginning of his dissertation,  Keynes first encountered economics.  Keynes’ working papers 
annotated by Marshall testify to this. Keynes was attending Marshall’s lectures in order to prepare 
himself for the Civil Service examination. In response to his questions, he wrote several working 
papers on theoretical and applied economics, ranging from the definition of capital to methods of index 
numbers, business size, monopolistic pricing and railway services. Marshall’s corrections and 
comments permit the reconstruction of the first dialogue between the master and his student. Here 
Marshall’s epistemological and philosophical convictions are transmitted  - not without resistance  - to 
Keynes. A s Raffaelli (1996) notes, Keynes arrived at Marshall's workshop from the mathematics 
course and had to learn the lesson of the experience, realism and common sense. Although Marshall 
had tried to induce him to pursue his studies in economics at that time, Keynes decided  to become a 
civil servant entering the India Office. However, in the summer of 1908 he came back to Cambridge as 
a lecturer in economics, after Marshall retired officially and Pigou was elected to the professorship of 
economics. Keynes lectured on the principles of economics until 1914. It was at that time that Keynes' 
career as an economist began. In this period there is another important moment in the intellectual relationship between Marshall and Keynes that reveals a remarkable common view on the application 
of statistical tools to social studies. In 1910 Marshall  - assisted by the young Keynes - criticised Karl 
Pearson's views, which were expressed in his study on the influence of alcoholic parents on their 
children written by Karl Pearson together with Ethel Elderton
10. Against the conventional belief, this 
study tried to demonstrate from the data that alcoholic parents exerted negligible detrimental influence 
on their offspring. In a letter on "Alcoholism and Efficiency" published in the letter column of the 
Times, Marshall expressed doubts on the choice of data and the inadequate account of the time element. 
He expressed his hope that someone "more competent" than himself would have written about the 
adequacy of the statistical base of t he study. It was Keynes who undertook this task. At that time 
Keynes was particularly interested in the  problem of statistical induction  – the last section of his 
Treatise on Probability is devoted to it. Furthermore he had written a paper on  index numbers in 1909. 
He did not share the theses on the probability theory expressed by Pearson, whom he called an adopter 
of "the Laplacian or mathematical method" (Keynes 1921: 428).  Keynes published a critique in the 
Statistical Journal, highly appreciated by M arshall. He maintained that no inference of general 
character could be inferred from these studies because the samples  were not representative of the 
whole population. He added that the report had not been able to show that the samples examined were 
homogeneous.  The controversy continued in the pages of the  Times, first between Pearson and 
Marshall, then between Pearson and Keynes, who replied against Pearson’s “Reply to the Cambridge 
Economists” at Marshall’s prompting.  As the controversy went on, the cooperation between Marshall 
and Keynes got closer. 
 
 
3.1.2. The 1920s: Keynes as a Marshallian 
 
In the 1920s economics became Keynes' main interest. He was establishing himself as a leader in the 
Cambridge school of economics. In that years Marshall showed an increasing regard for Keynes as an 
economist. He derived “an exceptional pleasure and profit” from the reading of  The Consequences of 
the Peace (letter to Keynes of January 1920). In 1923 Marshall welcomed the publication of the 
Monetary Reform  warmly
11.  Marshall was also very impressed with the  Cambridge Economic 
                                                                 
10 The episode is recounted  extensively by Groenewegen in his biography of Marshall (1995). 
11 So Marshall writes to Keynes on the 19
th of December, 1923: “Many thanks for your fascinating Monetary Reform. .. I 
have appointed myself amateur currency-mediciner: but I cannot give myself even a tolerably good testimonial in that Handbook series, edited by Keynes and Henderson. This comes out in his letters to Henderson (10 
January 1922) and Robertson (14 January 1922). Actually it was a "very Marshallian enterprise" as 
Groenewegen termed it (1995: 757)
12, 
13.  
Immediately after Marshall's death Keynes offered his synthesis of Marshall's work in his famous 
memoir published  in the Economic Journal of September 1924. He was able to catch the greatness of 
the founder of the economic school of Cambridge better than any of his contemporaries. In Keynes’ 
interpretation Marshall had two natures  - the preacher and the scientist  - and this was “the clue to 
Marshall’s mingled strength and weakness”.
  This diversity of nature was certainly an advantage, 
Keynes maintained, in the sense that it enabled Marshall to possess that rare combination of gifts which 
make an economist great. Keynes writes a passage as famous as it is important for helping us 
understand the two authors' common idea of economics:  
 
The study of economics does not seems require any specialised gifts of an usually high order. It is not, intellectually 
regarded, a very easy subject compared with the higher branches of philosophy and pure science ? Yet good, or even 
competent, economists are the rarest of birds. An easy subject, at which very few excel ! The paradox finds its explanation, 
perhaps, in that the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must reach a high standard in several 
different directions and must combine talents not often found together.  He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, 
philosopher – in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in terms 
of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study  the present in the light of the 
past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regards. He must 
be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near the 
earth as a politician. Much, but not all, of this ideal many-sidedness Marshall possessed. But chiefly his mixed training and 
divided nature furnished him with the  most essential and fundamental of the economist’s necessary gifts – he was 
conspicuously historian and mathematician, a dealer in particular and the general, the temporal and the eternal, at the same 
time (Keynes 1924: 173-4). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
capacity. And I am son to go away: but, if I have opportunity, I shall ask new-comers to the celestial regions whether you 
have succeeded in finding a remedy for currency-maladies”.  
12 Keynes' introduction to the first volume of the Handbooks (1922), contains this Marshallian statement: "The Theory of 
Economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a 
doctrine, an apparatus to draw correct conclusions … its modes of expression are much less precise than those provided by 
mathematical and scientific techniques … The main task of the professional economist now consists, either in obtaining a 
wide knowledge of relevant facts and exercising skill in the application of economic principles to them, or in expounding  
the elements of his method in a lucid, accurate and illuminating way" (p. v). 
13 Another example of the Marshallian way of research followed by Keynes in these years is represented by the articles and 
notes he  wrote  on the crisis of Lancashire cotton industry between 1926 and 1929 (Marchionatti 1995).  
Keynes claims for Marshall t he title of “founder of modern diagrammatic economics” (ibid.: 185). Here 
lies the greatness of the scientist, but Keynes observed that this did not prevent him from getting the 
limits of a mathematical approach to economics. Actually Marshall understood t hat the economic 
interpretation of the “complex and incompletely known facts of experience” requires to go beyond the 
“bare bones of economic theory” (ibid.: 186).  Keynes attributes Marshall with the capability to 
amalgamate “ logic and intuition and wide knowledge of facts, most of which are not precise.” This “is 
required for economic interpretation in its highest form” (ibid.: 186, note 2).  He left this 
methodological legacy to his pupils (and Keynes himself among them). 
Keynes' increasing interest in economics did not lead him to abandon his interest in  philosophy. In 
fact, in the later 1920s Keynes continued to develop his philosophical reflections. In a 1926 letter to F. 
M. Urban, translator of the German edition of the  Treatise,  Keynes expressed disappointment in the 
conceptual structure of the  Treatise and maintained that it can be improved by the development of the 
concept of vague knowledge, already introduced in the Treatise but scarcely analysed there (Keynes to 
F. M. Urban, 15 May 1926, in  Keynes Papers, file TP/12). His reference to the importance of vague 
knowledge in the letter to Urban probably reflects the increasing importance that Keynes attached to 
circumstances characterised by structural uncertainty and his belief that probability cannot be known 
merely in terms of logical relations but it should be approached psychologically. In his 1930 review of  
Ramsey’s book (Keynes 1930), he similarly reaffirmed the limits of a purely logical-formal approach 
to probability and the need to inquire into the field of human logic. Formal logic studies the question of  
the consistency of the degrees of beliefs, but it is not able to explain their bases.  His acknowledgement 
of the limits of formal logic goes well beyond his  Treatise. He substantially turns his theory of human 
conduct to a more 'general' theory of human behaviour, something that is able to consider complexity, 
the organic nature of social relations, and the vague character of knowledge (Marchionatti and Becchio 
2000). This falls in line w ith his Marshallian beliefs on the characteristics and requirements of 
economic interpretation. The Marshallian conception of the economics as an amalgam of "logic and 
intuition and wide knowledge of facts", present very early in Keynes, is philosophically deepened 
thanks to the post-Treatise development of his thought. From the early 1930s  it is translated at an 
analytical level and rid of the schemes of the ‘classical economists’. This process led to the 
construction of  the model of General Theory. 
 
 3.2. The 1930s: Keynes as a thinker of economic complexity 
 
     3.2.1. Some methodological premises to the General Theory: vagueness and the degree of 
precision advisable in economics 
 
In his Cambridge lectures (November, 1933) Keynes deals with the problem  - ‘What degree of 
precision is advisable in economics ?’ (Rymes 1989: 101). According to his students’ notes, Keynes 
maintained that ‘on the matter of precise definition of terms, there is some questions as to the utility 
and propriety of the scholastic e xercise in trying to define terms with great precision in a subject like 
economics’ (ibid.: 102). The danger of doing so ‘is that you may “precise everything away” and be left 
with only a comparative poverty of meaning’ (ibid.). In other terms, as Keynes s ays: “There is the 
danger of falling into scholasticism, the essence of which is treating what is vague as what is precise” 
(ibid.). Keynes maintains that “a generalisation to cover everything is impossible and impracticable." 
He adds that "generalising in economics is thinking by sample, not by generalisation”, a crucial 
statement which will be clear in the following discussion.   
Coates (1996 and 1997) associates these reflections of Keynes to his involvement with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's criticism of analytical philosophy beginning in the late 1920s, when Wittgenstein 
returned to Cambridge. Coates maintains that Keynes pointed out the problems that ensue from 
defining with artificial precision concepts that are characterised by what Wittgenstein defined as 
combinatory vagueness: "for the precise definition will leave out of account too much of what we 
intuitively intend when using the concept” (Coates 1997: 249). Marshall's influence on Keynes’ 
reflection too, however, is explicit in the 1933 lectures. Here K eynes positively referred to Marshall's 
method in his criticism of the scholasticism. He asks what precision is useful in economics.  He then 
notes that Marshall’s definitions were very loose, that many terms were not defined, but that much was 
provided that would allow the reader to infer the required definitions. In contrast, many other 
economists, in making their definitions precise, make them too rigid.  According to student's notes  
Keynes said:  
 
Marshall, for example, does not make any effort to use  his terms precisely, but you always get his meaning from the 
richness of his context. This is much better than that specious precision which some writers effect, because you are not 
misled by supposing the term to be precise, and you must supply the precision from the context and the whole of the thought  
(Rymes 1989: 102, my italics).  
 These observations are truly representative of the mature phase of Keynes’ thought. They are 
connected to those perplexities that, as Keynes writes in the  General Theory, " most impeded my 
progress in writing this book" (Keynes 1936: 37): the choice of units, the definition of income and last 
but not least the part played by expectations in economic analysis.  
  
 
3.2.2. The General Theory and after: Economics as a branch of logic and a moral science   
  
Unlike Marshall’s  Principles, the  General Theory does not have a chapter devoted to the method in 
economics. We have to search through Keynes’ methodological statements here and there in the book, 
in his other writings, and in  his correspondence of that period. His debates with Harrod and Tinbergen 
are particularly interesting from this point of view. 
Between July and September, 1938, Keynes had an exchange of letters with R. F. Harrod in connection 
with the latter's "Scope and  Method in Economics" (1938). This address provoked "plenty of thought" 
in Keynes (letter of July 4, in Keynes 1973c). It was the occasion for Keynes to make his mature 
conception of economics explicit. First of all, Keynes maintains that  “economics is a branch of logic, a 
way of thinking” (ibid.: 296). In a successive letter he adds: 
 
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the 
contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which it is applied 
is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time” (letter of July 4,  in Keynes 1973c: 297, my italics).    
 
Secondly, Keynes writes:   
 
economics is essentially a moral science and not a natural science. That is to say, it employs introspection and judgements 
of value (ibid., my italics). 
 
In a following letter (July 10) Keynes emphasises this fact: 
 
I also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science. I mentioned before that it deals with 
introspection and with values. I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties. One 
has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous (ibid.: 300, my italics). 
 Keynes thinks that economics is “essentially” a moral science. By moral science he meant that 
economics belongs to those disciplines that deal with human beings in their social environment, i.e. the 
human sciences. It is not  – Keynes emphasises  - a natural science, as Robbins had recently argued in 
his influential Essay on the nature and significance of economic science (1935).  The reason is that “the 
material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time.” In fact, 
economics deals with changing and unstable factors like “motives, expectations, psychological 
uncertainties” in a context of limited knowledge and structural uncertainty. This non-homogeneity 
through time compels economics to undertake inductive analysis and to take the particular 
characteristics of the historical world into account. In examining this material, economics uses 
introspection and  value judgements in order to discover the relevant factors needed to build a model or 
a sample, as Keynes  says in his 1933 lectures. Due to the nature of economic material, a complete and 
exact generalisation is not possible.
14  
As a consequence of the fact that economics doesn’t give us a complete statement but a sample 
statement, its way of exposition is quasi-formal. In an early fragment of the preface of the  General 
Theory, written around mid-1934, Keynes justifies his way of exposition: 
 
When we write economic theory we write in a quasi-formal style; and there can be no doubt, in spite of these disadvantages, 
that this is our best  available means of conveying our thoughts to one another. But when an economist writes in a quasi-
formal style, he is composing neither a document verbally complete and exact .. nor a logically complete proof. Whilst it is 
his duty to make his premises and his use of terms as clear as he can, he never states all his premises and his definitions are 
not perfectly clear-cut. He never mentions all the qualifications necessary to his conclusions. He has no means of stating, 
once and for all, the precise level of abstraction on which he is moving, and he does not move on the same level all the time. 
It is, I think, of the essential nature of economic exposition that it gives, not a complete statement, which, even if it were 
possible, would be prolix and complicated, to the point of obscurity, but a sample statement, so to speak, out of all the 
things  which could be said, intended to suggest  to the reader the whole bundle of associated ideas, so 
that, if he catches the bundle, he will not in the least be confused or impeded by the technical incompleteness of the mere 
words which the author has written down, taken by themselves.  
This means, on the one hand, that an economic writer requires from his reader much goodwill and intelligence and a large 
measure of co-operation; and, on the other hand, that there are a thousand futile, yet verbally legitimate, objections which an 
objector can raise (Keynes 1973b:  469-70, my italics) 
                                                                 
14 Keynes writes in General Theory, chapter 18: 
Our present object is to discover what determines at any time the national income of a given economic system and (which is 
almost the same thing) the amount of its employment; which means in a study so complex as economics, in which we 
cannot hope to make completely accurate generalisations, the factors whose changes mainly determine our quaesitum. Our 
final task might be to select those variables which can be deliberately controlled or managed by central authority in the kind 
of system in which we actually live (Keynes 1936: 247)  
If “we cannot hope to make completely accurate generalisations”  (Keynes 1936: 247), the right 
language for the construction of the model is not symbolic language but ordinary language, as in 
Marshall. The reason is:    
 
in ordinary discourse, where we are not blindly manipulating but know all the time what we are doing and what the words 
mean, we can keep 'at the back of our heads' the necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments which we shall 
have to make later on, in a way in which we cannot keep complicated partial differentials 'at the back' of several pages of 
algebra which assume that they all vanish (ibid.: 296-8). 
 
Ordinary language seems to be more efficient in handling the complexity of the economy. The essential 
consequence of this argument is that economic thinking cannot be reduced simply  to “blind 
manipulation”. Keynes writes:   
 
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible 
answer, but to provide ourselves with an organised and orderly method of thinking  out particular problems; and, after we 
have reached a provisional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we then have to go back on 
ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable interactions of the factors among themselves. This is the nature of 
economic thinking (Keynes 1936: 297, our italics).  
 
The construction of the ‘relevant’ model is the key problem. It does not emerge automatically out of 
empirical study as a result of a blind manipulation of data. The adequacy of  the model depends on the 
ability to select the relevant factors, “the factors whose changes mainly determine our  quaesitum” 
(Keynes 1936: 247).  The decision  which part of concrete reality to incorporate into a model is termed 
by Keynes ‘judgement of value’. This also makes economics an art because the construction of the 
relevant model needs the art of introspection in order to study psychic processes, and judgements of 
value. The model is, in fact, the result of a continuous correction of judgement.
15   T he selection of the 
relevant factors which constitute the model begins with the analysis of facts and facts are what 
economists must continuously refer to. As Keynes writes in a letter to Harrod  of the 10
th of July 1938): 
 
                                                                 
15 An example of the right way of approaching economic problems in the history of economics is, according to Keynes, that 
of Malthus. He was able "to penetrate these events with understanding by a mixture of intuitive selection and formal 
principles", "thus to interpret the problem  and propose the remedy" (Keynes 1933: 107) The specialist in the manufacture of models will not be successful unless he is constantly correcting his judgement by 




3.3.  Formal generalisation and complexity 
 
           3.3.1. The realm of the formally exact: “to disclose gaps and imperfections in your 
thought” 
 
Economic thinking cannot be simply 'blind manipulation of data'. This is the sense of Keynes' criticism 
of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of formalising a system of economic analysis. He writes: 
 
Too large a proportion of recent 'mathematical' economics are merely concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions 
they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of 
pretentious an unhelpful symbols (p. 296-8). 
 
Keynes thinks that symbolic methods  are not only useful but also necessary tools, but he strongly 
emphasises that they  cannot substitute the economist’s judgement.  We may refer  to the relationship 
money-prices in chapter 21 of the  General Theory to show what Keynes means when he writes that  
generalisations have an  instrumental role. After discussing the complications of the relation between 
the quantity of money and price-levels, Keynes tries to express the substance of his discourse in 
symbolic form. He derives the following expression: 
e = ed – (1 – ew) ed . ee eo 
where: e  = the response of money-prices to changes in the quantity of money 
           ed =  elasticity of effective demand in response to changes in the quantity of money 
           ew =  elasticity of wage in response to changes in the effective demand 
            eo = elasticity of output in response to changes in the effective demand 
            ee = elasticity of employment to changes in the effective demand 
  
"This last expression  – Keynes writes  - gives us the proportionate change in prices in response to a 
change in the quantity of money” and  “it can be regarded as a generalised statement of the quantity theory of money" (ibid.: 305).He then introduces his personal reservations about this formal treatment, 
pointing out the risks of its “blind”:  
 
I do not myself attach much value to manipulations of this kind; and I would repeat the warning, which I have given above, 
that they involve  just as much tacit assumption as to what variables are taken as independent (partial differentials being 
ignored throughout)  as does ordinary discourse  (ibid.). 
 
He concludes saying that the utility of these methods in his theoretical discourse is " to exhibit the 
extreme complexity  of the relationship between prices and the quantity of money, when we attempt to 
express it in a formal manner" (ibid.).  In his 1933 lectures he had expressed, about the utility of what 
he calls scholasticism, a really Marshallian opinion:  
 
The effort of trying to be scholastic does disclose gaps and imperfections in your thought, and thus helps  to satisfy yourself 
that your fluffy monster is really pretty good. The value is to yourself rather than to the reader (Rhymes 1989: 101-3). 
 
 
3.3.2. Outside the realm of the formally exact I: the influence of expectations and the business 
cycle 
 
One of the most important cases discussed in the  General Theory is that of long-term expectations. 
Here the characteristics of the non-homogeneity and complexity of the material make it not analysable 
in a formal way. Expectations are a major issue in the  General Theory and the recognition of their 
importance in the behaviour of economic agents is a fundamental contribution of Keynes. Long-term 
expectation depends on the most probable forecast that the agents can make and on the confidence with 
which they make that forecast, as Keynes writes in chapter 12.  Confidence is defined in terms of “how 
highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong” (Keynes 1936: 148). Our 
knowledge of the future is often “fluctuating, vague and uncertain” (Keynes [1937] 1979: 113). In such 
uncertainty “there is no scientific basis on which to form  any calculable probability whatever” (ibid.). 
In other words, it is not possible to use a  probabilistic theory of  expectations  – such as a rational 
expectation hypothesis à la Muth (1961), which assumes that expectations correctly identify the mean 
and variance of stochastic variables affecting future contingencies. On the contrary, in such uncertainty 
“it is reasonable .. to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts we feel somewhat confident 
about”, because “it would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain” (ibid.: 148).  How do we get around this informative and cognitive shortage 
? The answer to this question, Keynes maintains, is based on the observation of market and business 
psychology. In practice  -  as emerges from this inductive analysis  - agents have to fall back on 
conventional judgement and animal spirits, or, more precisely, to neither ‘rational’ nor ‘irrational’ 
motives, as Keynes wrote to his former pupil Hugh Townshend
16: 
 
Generally speaking, in making a decision we have before us a large number of alternatives, none of which is demonstrably 
more “rational” than the others, in the sense that we can arrange in order of merit the sum aggregate of the benefits 
obtainable from the complete consequences of each. To avoid being in the position of the Buridan’s ass, we fall back, 
therefore, and necessarily do so, on motives of another kind, which are not “rational” in the sense of being concerned with 
the evaluation of consequences, but are decided by habit, instinct, preference, desire, will, etc. (Keynes 1979: 294) 
 
Hence the complexity of human behaviour in conditions of structural uncertainty invalidates a formal 
probabilistic treatment of expectations. 
 Expectations are very important in business cycle phenomena, which, according to Keynes, are 
determined by investment. Since expectations and investment cannot be modelled with probabilistic 
relations, the business cycle is also beyond the domain of probabilistic inference. This is the key reason 
why   Keynes criticised the statistical testing of business cycle theories, like that of Tinbergen (1939). In 
1938-39 Keynes had a controversy with Tinbergen over whether statistical methods are the proper tools 
for testing business cycles theories. The central question raised by Keynes was methodological:  “the 
logic of applying the method of multiple correlation to unanalysed economic material, which we know 
to be non-homogeneous through time“ (Keynes 1973c: 285-6). He concludes that: 
 
“Taking everything into account, the successful application of this method to so enormously complex a problem as the 
business cycle does strike me as a singularly unpromising project  in the present state of our knowledge” (ibid.) 
 
In his 1939 review Keynes specifically raises the problem of passing from statistical description to 
inductive generalisation. He maintains that: 
 
                                                                 
16 For an attempt to interpret Keynes' analysis of economic behaviour under uncertainty in the context of bounded 
rationality theories, see Marchionatti (1999). the most important condition is that the environment … should be uniform and homogeneous over a period of time. We 
cannot be sure that such conditions will persist in the future, even if we find them in the past. But if we find them in the 




the main prima facie objection to the application of the method of multiple correlation to complex economic problems lies 
in the apparent lack of any adequate degree of uniformity in the environment. (ibid.) 
 
According to Keynes, statistics is to be used to test the validity of the model, but this is not feasible in 
the case of t he business cycle,  at least “in the present state of our knowledge.” He reasons that a 
correct prior specification doesn’t seem to be available in the case of a complicated problem like 
business cycle analysis. The complexity of the material is great. Therefore a positive a priori 
probability is difficult if not impossible to establish.   
 
3.4.  Keynes as a post-Marshallian 
 
Our account of Keynes’ beliefs on the nature of economic thinking and its method has tried to show 
that Keynes in the 1920s and 1930s flew  the flag of Marshall’s credo, which had been lowered by the 
new mainstream that appeared after the controversy on costs in the 1920s. Keynes accepted the specific 
criticism of Marshall’s representative firm device and the need to separate statics from dynamics. More 
generally, he accepted the need  to abandon Marshall’s idea of the continuity of different stages of 
reality as analysed by the economist. At the same time, he strongly emphasised the characteristics of 
economic material, which  makes economics  a moral science  and a science of thinking in terms of 
models. This forces the economist to use introspection and judgement of value, constantly corrected by 
“intimate and messy acquaintance with the facts to which his model is applied”. The economist is often  
forced to write in a quasi-formal style. This methodological strategy of research has its core in the 
logical question  – is it correct to apply a certain method to a certain specific problem ? It  is the natural 
opposite of the method of ‘blind manipulation’, as  Keynes called it. In this sense Keynes takes up 
Marshall’s message of economics as a science of complexity, but carries it beyond Marshall’s impasse. 
   
4. Coming back from the visit to the lumber room. Concluding remarks  
 
We are now able t o briefly consider the two questions raised in the introduction: a) was there a 
common ground in Marshall and Keynes on the nature of economic thinking ? b) are Marshall and 
Keynes old-fashioned economists ?  
The answer to the first question is positive. B oth Marshall and Keynes developed a conception of 
economics as a science that attempts to deal with complexity using several tools. Both saw a limited 
scope for the fruitful use of mathematics in economics. Both had a reasonable preference for a 
discursive and context-based style of exposition. Both considered the role of subjective judgement and 
intuition crucial for identifying the correct model and its implications. Keynes’ mature position of the 
1930s was the result of a thinking influenced by his reflection on the theory of probability as well as 
Marshall's lesson. By emphasising the idea of economics as a science of thinking in terms of samples 
or models without aspiring to generalisations to cover everything  - as Marshall did with his successive 
approximation approach of Book V of the Principles -, Keynes overcomes his predecessor’s impasse. 
Regarding the second question, we can first maintain that  the reasons why Marshall and Keynes may 
be seen as 'old-fashioned economists' are not the result of a bounded methodological awareness and 
ignorance of formal techniques, as supposed by contemporary critics. On the contrary, they come out of 
a reflection on the peculiarity of economic material and the possibility of dealing with it using formal 
treatments.  
But are their doubts, criticisms, their preference for a quasi-formal style, and their invitation to 
prudence in the use of mathematical formalisation of any significance today ? The answer to this 
question requires some considerations on the most recent developments of economics.  
Certainly today, as in Marshall’s and Keynes’ times, the traditional mathematical approach in 
economics based on linearity and systems of differential equations seems not to be the best way to 
understand complex situations such a s those today called adaptive non-linear networks (Arthur, 
Durlauf and Lane 1997), which are characterised by interactions between heterogeneous agents with 
limited cognitive resources who revise continually their behaviour as they accumulate experience, a nd 
innovate.  Non-linear dynamic approaches to cope with these complexities have recently emerged. 
They use techniques that have made it possible to explore the consequences of relatively complex 
systems  in a way which was never possible before. They have been successfully applied to examine 
such phenomena as speculative bubbles and path dependence in various contexts. (For a survey, see Barkley-Rosser 1999). As regards the topic of this paper, these approaches confirm two important 
points which were raised here. First, the continuity hypothesis is not effective. In fact, gradual changes 
(in the degree of interaction, for example) can lead to discontinuous changes. Secondly, the dynamical 
behaviour of even simple economic systems is surprisingly complex   ( Saari 1995). The emphasis on 
the existence of complications in treating economic problems confirms that Keynes was probably right 
in warning economists not to fall into the 'blind manipulation mechanism' and not to react to difficulties 
as Tinbergen did, a ccording to Keynes, that is engaging "another ten computers and down his sorrows 
in arithmetic" (Keynes 1939). Today the risk of acting like this is – after having abandoned the simple 
but certain field of the principles of mainstream economics  – that we m ay create a great number of 
special cases among which nobody can reasonably choose. On the contrary the issue is, as Keynes 
emphasised, our ability to  select the relevant factors in the economic system “in which we actually 
live” and to thereby  construct  the relevant model. 
In conclusion let us summarise the most relevant points of a Marshall-Keynes methodological agenda 
in order to analyse complex economic systems:  
-  firstly, mathematics is the correct approach  only when it is coherent with the properties of the 
system to be analysed; 
-  secondly, the search for general results that hold for all times and every situation  - exact 
generalisations to cover everything - is a 'chimera'; 
-  thirdly, the quasi-formal style of exposition is  often the most appropriate one: it is intended to 
suggest "the whole bundle of associated ideas"; 
-  fourthly, a mixture of intuition, judgements of value and analytical ability  - trained common sense - 
is required for dealing with complexity in economics; the ability to constantly amalgamate “ logic 
and intuition and wide knowledge of facts" is the crucial factor in economic interpretation. 
In the light of the evolution of economics in the Twentieth Century, it seems that Marshall’s and 
Keynes’ old-style agenda is not out-of-date for the  economists of the Twenty-First century. Their 
methodological reflections and warnings can be help us when we look for  - as many contemporary 
economists do – more and more satisfying answers to the question of the analysis of complex situations 
out of the s chemes of mainstream economics. In any case, their reflections certainly represent a 
challenge for the economists who indulge themselves in the opinion that spending time discussing 
logical questions on the propriety of the tools they use for their purposes is  scarcely interesting. 
Paradoxically these economists are the very ones who are running the risk of being the really old-
fashioned actors on the scene of contemporary economics.  References 
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